In a very active end of summer for labor law, the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) ruled in a 2-1 decision, in Quickway Transportation, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 127, that a company’s closure of a terminal where its drivers were unionized violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The Board found that the company violated Sections 8(a)(3) and (5) of the NLRA for firing unionized truck drivers in order to chill unionism at other locations— even though the company did not actually know about any other ongoing unionization efforts at its other locations—and failing to bargain with the union over the decision or the effects of the decision.

Factual Background

In Quickway, drivers at a company’s Louisville terminal voted to unionize in the summer of 2020. The lead-up to the election and its results were contentious. Management objected to the results of the election, but these objections were overruled by the Board, and management eventually agreed to bargain with the union.

However, after the first bargaining session, the company feared the financial ramifications of failing to reach a deal in bargaining and incurring a strike. In response, the company withdrew from an existing contract with an external distributor that made up over 95% of the drivers’ business at the terminal, then fired all the drivers at the terminal, and subleased the building to a third-party for the term of the lease.

Plant Closure Violated the NLRA under the Darlington Factors

The union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging a number of violations, including that the plant closure violated Sections 8(a)(3), (a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.

The standard set by the Supreme Court decision in Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), applied to the facts of the case.  Under Darlington, a partial-closure of a business violates Section 8(a)(3) “if [it was] motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining plants of the single employer and if the employer may reasonably have foreseen that such closing would likely have that effect.”

To establish a violation of the Act, the NLRB General Counsel must demonstrate that (i) the employer closed the plant for anti-union reasons, (ii) the employer had interests in other businesses, (iii) the decision was motivated by a desire to chill unionism at other locations, and (iv) the chilling effect at other locations was reasonably foreseeable.     

The ALJ found that the plant closure did not violate the NLRA, because the decision to close the plant was not motivated in part to chill unionism at the company’s other locations.  However, the Board’s majority disagreed.

The Board concluded that while there was no “credible evidence” that the company actually knew there was active union campaigning at any of its other locations, , management at the Louisville terminal was concerned that union activity could “infect” drivers at other locations, and took actions to make sure that drivers at a nearby branch did not interact with the Louisville truck drivers. The Board also observed that the Louisville terminal had a mechanic shop operated by the company that was not yet unionized, which led to the Board’s conclusion that the proximity of the non-union workers to the unionized workers could reasonably lead to the inference that the company wanted to chill union activity in the remaining employees at the terminal.

The other factors under the Darlington test were less disputed. The ALJ and NLRB majority both agreed that several incidents in the run-up to the election, and after the union was elected, established that the company ceased operations at the terminal because of union animus.

The Board majority also held that the company violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, for failing to bargain with the union over the plant closure decision.  While employers may unilaterally close part of their business “for purely economic reasons” under First National Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), since the Board found that the purported entrepreneurial decision here was motivated by anti-union reasons, the decision was not exempt form a bargaining obligation. 

Member Kaplan’s Dissent

Board Member Marvin Kaplan disagreed with the Board’s application of Darlington, and dissented, stating that there was no motive to chill unionism at other company locations based on the evidence adduced before the ALJ, “because the [company] was unaware of ongoing union activity at any other terminal, nor did it believe that union organizing at any other terminal was imminently intended.”

Takeaways

As a practical matter, the impact of the Board’s decision here for the company was significant, as the Board required the company to reopen and restore its business at the Louisville terminal that existed on December 9, 2020, when it closed, as well as offer reinstatement to the employees who were unlawfully discharged and make them whole for all loss of earnings, other benefits, and other direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms suffered, among other things.

While the holding in Quickway does not overturn existing Board precedent like many other cases recently published, the decision shows that the current composition of the Board will closely scrutinize plant closures under the Darlington factors. 

Rather than strictly construing actual knowledge of union activity at other locations, the Board majority here inferred animus from “the presence or absence of several factors including, inter alia, contemporaneous union activity at the employer’s remaining facilities, geographic proximity of the employer’s facilities to the closed operation, the likelihood that employees will learn of the circumstances surrounding the employer’s unlawful conduct through employee interchange or contact, and, of course, representations made by the employer’s officials and supervisors to the other employees.”

Employers should take heed of these factors and how this current composition of the Board would evaluate them in the event of a plant closure. 

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Photo of Joshua Fox Joshua Fox

Joshua S. Fox is a senior counsel in the Labor & Employment Law Department and a member of the Sports, Labor-Management Relations, Class and Collective Actions and Wage and Hour Groups.

As a member of the Sports Law Group, Josh has represented several…

Joshua S. Fox is a senior counsel in the Labor & Employment Law Department and a member of the Sports, Labor-Management Relations, Class and Collective Actions and Wage and Hour Groups.

As a member of the Sports Law Group, Josh has represented several Major League Baseball Clubs in all aspects of the salary arbitration process, including the Miami Marlins, Boston Red Sox, Los Angeles Dodgers, Kansas City Royals, San Francisco Giants, Tampa Bay Rays and Toronto Blue Jays. In particular, Josh successfully represented the Miami Marlins in their case against All-Star Catcher J.T. Realmuto, which was a significant club victory in salary arbitration. Josh also represents Major League Baseball and its clubs in ongoing litigation brought by current and former minor league players who allege minimum wage and overtime violations. Josh participated on the team that successfully defended Major League Baseball in a wage-and-hour lawsuit brought by a former volunteer for the 2013 All-Star FanFest, who alleged minimum wage violations under federal and state law. The lawsuit was dismissed by the federal district court, and was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Josh also has extensive experience representing professional sports leagues and teams in grievance arbitration proceedings, including playing a vital role in all aspects of the grievance challenging the suspension for use of performance-enhancing drugs of then-New York Yankees third baseman Alex Rodriguez. Josh also has counseled NHL Clubs and served on the trial teams for grievances alleging violations of the collective bargaining agreement, including cases involving use of performance-enhancing substances, domestic violence issues, and supplementary discipline for on-ice conduct. He has played a key role in representing professional sports leagues in all aspects of their collective bargaining negotiations with players and officials, including the Major League Baseball, National Hockey League, the National Football League, Major League Soccer, the Professional Referee Organization, and the National Basketball Association,.

In addition, Josh has extensive experience representing clients in the performing arts industry, including the New York City Ballet, New York City Opera, Big Apple Circus, among many others, in collective bargaining negotiations with performers and musicians, the administration of their collective bargaining agreements, and in grievance arbitrations.

Josh also represents a diverse range of clients, including real estate developers and contractors, pipe line contractors, hospitals, hotels, manufacturers and public employers, in collective bargaining, counseling on general employment matters and proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board, New York State Public Employment Relations Board and arbitrators.

Josh has also recently served as an adjunct professor at Cornell University’s School of Industrial Labor Relations for the past two years, teaching a course regarding Major League Baseball salary arbitration.

Prior to joining Proskauer, Josh worked for a year and a half at the National Hockey League, where he was involved in all labor and employment matters, including preparations for collective bargaining, grievance arbitration, contract drafting and reviewing and employment counseling. Josh also interned in the labor relations department of Major League Baseball and at Region 2 of the National Labor Relations Board. He was a member of the Brooklyn Law Review and the Appellate Moot Court Honor Society and served as president of the Brooklyn Entertainment and Sports Law Society.

Photo of Mark Theodore Mark Theodore

Mark Theodore is a partner in the Labor & Employment Law Department. He has devoted his practice almost exclusively to representing management in all aspects of traditional labor law matters throughout the U.S. He is Co-Chair of Proskauer’s Labor-Management and Collective Bargaining Practice…

Mark Theodore is a partner in the Labor & Employment Law Department. He has devoted his practice almost exclusively to representing management in all aspects of traditional labor law matters throughout the U.S. He is Co-Chair of Proskauer’s Labor-Management and Collective Bargaining Practice Group.

Some recent highlights of his career include:

  • Successfully defended client against allegations that it had terminated a union supporter and isolated another. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 15 (2017).
  • Successfully appealed NLRB findings that certain of client’s written policies violated the National Labor Relations Actions Act.  T-Mobile USA, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 171 (2016), enf’d in part, rev’d in part 865 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2017).
  • Represented major utility in NLRB proceedings related to organizing of planners.  Secured utility-wide bargaining unit. Bargained on behalf of grocery chain.  After negotiations reached an impasse, guided the company through lawful implementation of five year collective bargaining agreement.
  • Coordinated employer response in numerous strike situations including a work stoppage across 14 western states of the client’s operations.

Mark has extensive experience representing employers in all matters before the NLRB, including representation petitions, jurisdictional disputes and the handling of unfair labor practice charges from the date they are filed through trial and appeal. Mark has acted as lead negotiator for dozens of major companies in a variety of industries, including national, multi-unit, multi-location, multi-employer and multi-union bargaining. Mark has handled lockout and strike situations, coordinating the clients efforts.

In addition, Mark has handled hundreds of arbitrations involving virtually every area of dispute, including contract interest arbitration, contract interpretation, just cause termination/discipline, benefits, pay rates, and hours of work.