For thirty-two years, it has been a settled proposition that an employer may, upon the expiration of a contract, refuse to continue to negotiate with a “mixed-guard” union that represents its security guards. Continuing its long path of upsetting established precedent, on June 9, 2016, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) reversed this and made clear that going forward a voluntary recognition of such a mixed-guard unit will require continued recognition just like any other bargaining unit. Loomis Armored US, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (June 9, 2016).

A “mixed-guard union” is a labor organization that represents both security guards and other nonguard employees. Section 9(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or the “Act”) expressly prohibits the Board from certifying mixed-guard unions as the collective bargaining representative for security guards.  However, the Board has long held that an employer may voluntarily recognize a mixed-guard union as the representative of its employees.

In 1984, in Wells Fargo, the Board held that if an employer voluntarily recognizes a mixed-guard union, it may later withdraw recognition from the union for any reason as long as there was no contract in effect. Wells Fargo Corp., 270 N.L.R.B. 787 (1984).  The Board’s holding was based in part on the legislative intent behind Congress enacting Section 9(b)(3) of the Act, which was aimed “to shield employers of guards from the potential conflict of loyalties arising from the guard union’s representation of nonguard employees or its affiliation with other unions who represent nonguard employees.”

In Loomis, the Board completely overruled Wells Fargo.  The Board held that once an employer voluntarily recognizes a mixed-guard union, it may only withdraw recognition if the union loses majority support among the employees.  This rule applies to all other bargaining units, and the Board reasoned that the same rule should apply to guards as well – – placing an emphasis on the importance of preserving “stability in collective bargaining,” a tenet of the NLRA.

The Board dismissed the presence of any inconsistencies between its holding and the “conflict of loyalties” that concerned Congress when enacting Section 9(b)(3). The Board explained that employers recognizing mixed-guard unions will trade their ability to remove the union with whatever advantage recognizing the union brings the employer:  “An employer of guards thus may conclude that the potential conflict that concerned Congress either is not present or is outweighed by the potential advantages of entering into a collective-bargaining relationship with a mixed-guard union. And, in fact, a significant number of employers have availed themselves of this option.”  (Of course, those employers voluntarily recognized when they knew they could withdraw that recognition without challenge in the future.)

Importantly, though, the Board refused to apply its holding retroactively. Therefore, the Board’s rule from Wells Fargo will apply to all past and current cases, and the new Loomis holding will only apply to future cases.

Board Member Miscimarra dissented from the majority, arguing that the Board’s holding in Wells Fargo is more in line with the Congressional intent behind Section 9(b)(3) of the Act.  He stated  that “[i]f Congress deemed it objectionable to have guards represented by ‘certified’ mixed guard/nonguard unions, such an arrangement would appear equally objectionable when provided by a mixed guard/nonguard union that received voluntary recognition.”  Thus, Member Miscimarra found that it would be most consistent with Congressional intent to never allow mixed-guard unions to represent guards.  Still, he acknowledged some countervailing reasons for permitting voluntary recognition of mixed-guard unions, such as the need for unions to expand their membership.  Ultimately though, Member Miscimarra held that the Board in Wells Fargo applied Section 9(b)(3) in the “most appropriate manner.”  He further concluded that after thirty-two years of the Wells Fargo rule, the Board lacked compelling reasons to reverse the rule.

This case is very important for companies that employ security guards. Employers that currently recognize a mixed-guard unit/union must understand their continuing obligation to recognize the union, even after contract expiration – – a change which may materially impact bargaining leverage in future negotiations.  Moreover, employers with non-union security guards should also be cognizant of the shift in the law, which may limit the likelihood of future voluntary recognitions.  If a mixed-guard union seeks voluntary recognition, the employer should be aware that agreeing to that request will now bind the employer unless and until the union loses majority support.

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Photo of Michael Lebowich Michael Lebowich

Michael J. Lebowich is a partner in the Labor & Employment Law Department and co-head of the Labor-Management Relations Group. He represents and counsels employers on a wide range of labor and employment matters, with a particular interest in the field of traditional…

Michael J. Lebowich is a partner in the Labor & Employment Law Department and co-head of the Labor-Management Relations Group. He represents and counsels employers on a wide range of labor and employment matters, with a particular interest in the field of traditional labor law.

Michael acts as the primary spokesperson in collective bargaining negotiations, regularly handles grievance arbitrations, assists clients in the labor implications of corporate transactions, and counsels clients on union organizing issues, strike preparation and day-to-day contract administration issues. He also has significant experience in representation and unfair labor practice matters before the National Labor Relations Board.

His broad employment law experience includes handling of race, national origin, gender and other discrimination matters in state and federal court. A significant amount of his practice is devoted to counseling clients regarding the application and practical impact of the full range of employment laws that affect our clients, including all local, state and federal employment discrimination statutes, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and state labor laws.

Michael has substantial experience in a wide variety of industries, including entertainment, broadcasting, newspaper publishing and delivery, utilities and lodging. He represents such clients as The New York Times, BuzzFeed, ABC, the New York City Ballet, PPL, Pacific Gas & Electric, Host Hotels and Resorts, and The Broadway League (and many of its theater owner and producing members).  Michael also has significant public sector experience representing, among others, the City of New York and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

Michael is a frequent guest lecturer at Columbia Business School, the Cornell School of Hotel Administration, the New York University Tisch School for Hospitality, Tourism and Sports Management, and is an advisory board member of the Cornell Institute for Hospitality Labor and Employment Relations.