Employee’s Failed Attempt To Secure Union Representation Sufficient Notice of Weingarten Request, Divided NLRB Rules

One area of labor relations that continues to vex practitioners is the scope of the so-called Weingarten rights. NLRB v. J. Weingarten Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). Some 43 years after the Supreme Court set forth the right that represented employees are entitled to union representation when facing an interview that could lead to discipline, there still exist areas that are vaguely defined. For instance, we saw that an employer’s search of an employee’s vehicle is not a “disciplinary interview.” We also have seen have also seen that a fellow employee is not a “union representative for purposes of Weingarten.

What words must an employee utter to put the employer on notice that he or she wishes union representation? A divided NLRB recently addressed this issue and ruled that an employee’s remarks that he had previously contacted the union about a scheduled interview was sufficient to constitute a request for a Weingarten representative. In Circus Circus, Inc., 366 NLRB No. 110 (June 15, 2018), the NLRB was asked to evaluate whether an employee’s indirect statement about calling for union representation was sufficient to put the employer on notice that he wished to have a union representative at a disciplinary meeting.

The Employee Attempts but Fails to Reach His Union Representative

The facts of the case are fairly straightforward. The employer required all employees to be fitted with respirators as part of an OSHA requirement. An employee refused due to stated medical reasons and the employer started disciplinary proceedings. The employer suspended the employee pending investigation. The employer scheduled a “due process” meeting to discuss the issue and potentially issue discipline to the employee. In advance of the meeting the employee called his union three times but did not hear back. Upon entering the meeting, the employee discovered that no union representative was present and stated to the employer representatives, “I called the Union three times [and] nobody showed up, I’m here without representation.” The employer continued with the meeting and the employee ultimately was discharged.

The employee filed NLRB charges over the discharge and included an allegation that his Weingarten rights had been violated.

After a trial the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the employee’s “statement constitutes a request for representation [because] [s]ubsumed in the statement is a reasonably understood request to have someone present at the meeting.”

The employer appealed.

Divided Board Concludes Employee’s Statement Was a Weingarten Request for Representation

On appeal, a two member majority (Pearce and McFerran) of the Board agreed with the Administrative Law Judge that the employee’s statement was tantamount to a request for representation noting:

Board law is clear that ‘[n]o magic or special words are required [to trigger a Weingarten request]…It is enough if the language used by the employee is reasonably calculated to apprise the [e]mployer that the employee is seeking such assistance.’ Houston Coca Cola Bottling Co., 265 NLRB 1488, 1497 (1982).

Chairman Ring dissented. The Chairman noted that Weingarten rights arise only in situations “where the employee requests representation.” The Chairman noted further:

As the majority’s discussion reveals, [the employee’s] efforts to secure a union representative were directed to the Union, not the Respondent. To the latter, [the employee] said only that he had unsuccessfully tried to contact the union hall to obtain a representative and that he was attending the meeting without one. He did not request an alternative representative, even though his shop steward worked right across the hallway. Nor did he seek a delay so that a representative could be found.

Takeaways

This case is certainly open to debate and raises more questions than it answers. For instance, why didn’t the union return the calls? Why did the employee not object to the continuation of the meeting?

On balance, if an employee mentions union representative at the beginning of a disciplinary interview but doesn’t expressly ask for one, it is probably best to clear up this issue before beginning the interview. Such an inquiry could avoid litigation over this kind of issue.

Tags: investigatory interview, NLRB, request, Section 8(a)(1), union representation, Weingarten rights

NLRB General Counsel Issues Handbook on Handbook Rules

By Michael Lebowich, Joshua Fox and Jay M. Cohen on June 7, 2018 Posted in Advice, General Counsel, Handbook, NLRA, NLRB, Non-Union employers, Section 7, Uncategorized

Following up on the NLRB’s decision in The Boeing Company, 365 NLRB No. 154 (Dec. 14, 2017), on June 6, NLRB General Counsel Peter Robb issued a new Guidance Memorandum (18-04) detailing how NLRB Regional Offices receiving claims of improper employment policies are to interpret employer workplace rules. As we reported this past December (here), in Boeing, the Board established a new (and much more employer-friendly) standard for the lawfulness of employee work rules. As discussed in detail below, the Memo gives examples of specific policies that are to be found lawful and directs Regional Offices to no longer interpret ambiguous rules against the drafter or generalized provisions as banning all activity that could conceivably be included within the rule. Thus, Regional Offices will now look to whether a rule would be interpreted as prohibiting Section 7 activity, as opposed to whether it could conceivably be so interpreted.

In Boeing, the Board reassessed its standard for when the mere maintenance of a work rule violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. The Board established a new standard that focused on the balance between the rule’s negative impact on employees’ abilities to exercise their NLRA Section 7 rights, and the rule’s connection to an employer’s right to maintain discipline and productivity in the workplace. Going forward, work rules are to be categorized in three categories: (1) rules that are generally lawful to maintain; (2) rules warranting individualized scrutiny; and (3) rules that are plainly unlawful to maintain. The General Counsel’s Memo places a number of commonly found workplace policies into these three groupings.

Category 1 Rules are generally lawful either because the rule, when reasonably interpreted, does not prohibit or interfere with the exercise of rights guaranteed by the NLRA, or because the potential adverse impact on protected rights is outweighed by the business justifications associated with the rule. The examples provided in the Memo of the types of rules that fall into this category include:

Civility rules (such as “disparaging, or offensive language is prohibited”);
No-photography rules and no-recording rules;
Rules against insubordination, non-cooperation, or on-the-job conduct that adversely affects operations;
Disruptive behavior rules (such as “creating a disturbance on company premises or creating discord with clients or fellow employees is prohibited”);
Rules protecting confidential, proprietary, and customer information or documents;
Rules against defamation or misrepresentation;
Rules against using employer logos or intellectual property;
Rules requiring authorization to speak for the company; and
Rules banning disloyalty, nepotism, or self-enrichment.

Category 2 Rules are not obviously lawful or unlawful, and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the rule would interfere with rights guaranteed by the NLRA, and if so, whether any adverse impact on those rights is outweighed by legitimate justifications. General Counsel Robb identified the following examples of types of Category 2 Rules:

Broad conflict-of-interest rules that do not specifically target fraud and self-enrichment and do not restrict membership in, or voting for, a union;
Confidentiality rules broadly encompassing “employer business” or “employee information” (as opposed to confidentiality rules regarding customer or proprietary information, or confidentiality rules more specifically directed at employee wages, terms of employment, or working conditions);
Rules regarding disparagement or criticism of the employer (as opposed to civility rules regarding disparagement of employees);
Rules regulating use of the employer’s name (as opposed to rules regulating use of the employer’s logo/trademark);
Rules generally restricting speaking to the media or third parties (as opposed to rules restricting speaking to the media on the employer’s behalf);
Rules banning off-duty conduct that might harm the employer (as opposed to rules banning insubordinate or disruptive conduct at work, or rules specifically banning participation in outside organizations); and
Rules against making false or inaccurate statements (as opposed to rules against making defamatory statements).

Category 3 Rules are generally unlawful because they would prohibit or limit NLRA-protected conduct, and the adverse impact on the rights guaranteed by the NLRA outweighs any justifications associated with the rule. The examples provided in the Memo of the types of rules that fall into this category include:

Confidentiality rules specifically regarding wages, benefits, or working conditions; and
Rules against joining outside organizations or voting on matters concerning the employer.

Prior to Boeing, employers had been far more hesitant to prohibit employee conduct when crafting handbook rules for fear that those rules could be construed as possibly infringing on employees’ Section 7 rights. NLRB GC Robb’s Guidance Memorandum provides helpful clarity, with a detailed analysis and specific examples, as to how certain types of workplace rules would fall within the three-category analysis espoused by the Board in Boeing. The Memorandum is particularly enlightening to employers as it foreshadows the manner in which a NLRB Regional Office would prosecute a potential unfair labor practice charge brought by an employee or union. Significantly, GC Robb expressly stated that Regions will not interpret ambiguities in rules against the drafter – this certainly benefits employers in any proceeding. We expect this guidance to lead to fewer charges brought against employers in this arena, but only if employers heed the GC’s advice when drafting their employee handbooks.

Tags: Advice, employer handbooks, employer policies, General Counsel, handbook rules, NLRA, NLRB, Section 7

NLRB Considers Rulemaking to Address Hotly-Contested Joint-Employer Standard

By Mark Theodore, Joshua Fox and Dana N. Berber on May 14, 2018 Posted in Joint Employer, NLRA, NLRB, Rulemaking

As we previously reported here, here and here, the NLRB’s “joint employer” standard has vacillated over the last several years, and currently remains in flux. For historical reference, the NLRB expanded the scope of joint-employment in 2015 in Browning-Ferris, 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015), and then reverted to a more rigorous showing that had been required for years in Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., 365 NLRB No. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017).

Most recently, under extensive political pressure, the Board vacated Hy-Brand due to Member William Emanuel’s participation in the decision; Emanuel’s former firm, Littler Mendelson, represented one of the unsuccessful parties in Browning-Ferris and was under pressure by lawmakers to recuse himself. Since then, with cases pending before the Board and courts involving potential joint-employer liability, parties on both sides of this issue have been on the edge of their seats awaiting guidance.

In a stark and unconventional departure from the Board’s normal practices—which is to overturn prior legal precedent through decision-making, rather than rulemaking—the NLRB announced that it is considering rulemaking to address the joint-employer standard. On May 9, 2018, the Office of the Information and Regulatory Affairs published a Board submission, prepared at the request of Board Chairman John Ring, that the Board may be determining the joint-employer standard under the Act via rulemaking. This is unusual because the Board has only engaged in rulemaking a few times in its 83-year history, one of which (the agency’s attempt to require all employers to post a notice of rights under the NLRA) ended badly.

An apparent benefit of pursuing change through the rulemaking process, rather than an adversary proceeding, is that there does not appear to be the same potential arguments that Member Emanuel or any other Board Member must recuse him or herself based on the identities of the interested parties.

In the NLRB press release, recently-confirmed Chairman Ring emphasized the importance of restoring clarity in determining joint-employer status, and also touted that proceeding down this path allows the Board to hear “all views” on this critical issue before reaching a decision. Chairman Ring also promised that the Board would issue a proposed rule “as soon as possible” after hearing from all interested parties on the issue.

The Board has formally taken the necessary steps to begin the long public comment process associated with rulemaking here. The regulatory agenda includes a proposal, but notably does not indicate the participation of Members Mark Gaston Pearce and Lauren McFerran, the Board’s two Democratic-members.

The next steps are as follows: If and when the proposed rule receives support from a majority of the five-member Board (notably, neither Members Pearce or McFerran would be needed), the Board will then issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which will open the process for public comment to receive at least one round of written comments on the proposed rule. The Board may also elect to hold public hearings, which may include cross-examination, and provide additional comment periods to obtain more information.

Although the next Board can reverse any decision made through this process, subsequent Boards will similarly have to trudge through the arduous and prolonged formalities of the rulemaking and notice-and-comment period to accomplish that objective.

The Board’s potential use of rulemaking here is quite an interesting reaction to the extensive political pressure placed by lawmakers on the Board’s members to recuse themselves from cases involving parties currently or formerly represented by their prior firms.

We will keep you posted as to how this unfolds in the closely-watched context of the joint-employer standard, as well as whether rulemaking evolves into the new modus operandi of the Trump Board in light of the political heat the Board members have recently faced.

Tags: joint employer, NLRA, NLRA rulemaking, NLRB, Rulemaking

Thorough Employer Investigation Helps Establish Employer’s “Honest Belief” of Employees’ Picket Line Misconduct

By Mark Theodore on May 9, 2018 Posted in Collective Bargaining, General Counsel, Investigations, NLRA, NLRB, Protected activity, Section 7, Section 8(a)(1), Strikes, Uncategorized, Unfair Labor Practices

The Board is now operating at a full complement and is issuing decisions on a fairly regular basis. Nothing earth shattering in terms of law (which is kind of a relief) but there are some interesting issues worth discussing. A frequent topic of discussion here is the often blurry line between what constitutes “protected” versus “unprotected” employee conduct and how difficult it can be to defend claims that a discipline or termination violated the Act. See some examples here, here and here. When there is an ongoing labor dispute, such as a strike, it can be difficult to discipline or discharge an employee for misconduct that is bound up with the dispute.

In a recent NLRB decision, the employer’s thorough and complete investigation helped establish the lawfulness of its termination of some employees whose misconduct occurred in the midst of a strike.

In Kapstone Paper and Packaging Corporation, 366 NLRB No. 63 (April 20, 2018) the Board was confronted with a situation where negotiations over a new contract stalled and a strike occurred. During the few days of the strike four employees were terminated for misconduct. These terminations formed the basis of the charges alleging the employer discriminated against the employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.

The Employer’s Operation

Employer operates a paper and pulp mill in the state of Washington where approximately 1,000 unionized employees work. The employer’s operation is “situated in a remote location, accessible by a single, one-mile road–Fiber Way.” The road does not have any residential or commercial development and all employees drive their private vehicles to the plant.

Union Negotiations Break Down; a Strike Is Called

The parties were “embroiled” in contract negotiations which failed to produce an agreement. The union threatened a strike, to which the employer responded by writing a letter to the union warning that “any employee who engages in serious strike misconduct (e.g., violence damage to property, threats of bodily harm) or violations of the law” would be subject to discipline or discharge.

The union eventually went out on strike. The union held required training sessions for all employees which reinforced that union members were to “exhibit normal, respectful behavior on the picket line.” Strikers were also given the union’s “Picket Line Dos and Don’ts” which further detailed appropriate picket line conduct. These rules specifically stated, among other things, that strikers were not to “swarm” vehicles entering/exiting the plant, which was defined as standing collectively in front of or surround vehicles or obstruct vehicles’ entrances or exits.

Employee Kicks One Vehicle Causing Damage and Jumps on the Hood of Another

One striker who had attended training on dos and don’ts was on picket line duty with approximately 10-15 other strikers. A pickup truck from one of the employer’s contractors entered the mill and the employee kicked the passenger side rear panel which appeared to cause damage.

In a separate incident occurring an hour later the employee and some of other picketers gathered in front of a vehicle leaving the mill. One picketer stated, “there’s another one” a presumed reference to the fact the vehicle belonged to a contractor. When the vehicle stopped the employee jumped on the hood and as he did so his picket sign made contact with the windshield. When the picketers parted the vehicle accelerated throwing the picketing employee off.

Both incidents were caught on videotape.

The Employer Obtains an Injunction

The kicking incident and others formed the basis for the employer’s application for and grant of a state court injunction which stated, in part, that “No one will attempt to block or impede traffic entering or leaving the. . . mill site.”

Three Employees Block Exiting Semi-truck

After the injunction was issued, three picketers, all of whom had received the union’s training, decided to position themselves in such a manner so as to block larger trucks that needed to make a wide turn onto the access road from the mill gate. Although the three employees were on the access road “right of way” they knew that by standing where trucks had to turn they would cause a “choke” point which would force the driver of the truck have to make a choice between hitting some parked cars or hitting the picketers. One truck physically could not make the turn and could not back up so the picketers effectively blocked all ingress and egress to the mill. Law enforcement was called and after an exchange the picketers finally moved.

The Employer Investigates the Incidents and Decides to Terminate the Four Employees

The employer’s security manager, who had conducted numerous investigations for the employer, conducted the investigation into these incidents. The security manager reviewed all the videotape and spoke to witnesses. The security manager inspected the truck in the kicking incident and determined there was damage to the vehicle. In the second truck incident (where the employee landed on the hood), the security manager observed the broken windshield but after review of all the evidence could not conclude when the windshield had been broken by the striker.

The security manager asked all four employees to provide written statements of their version of events.

The kicker/hood leaper wrote: “[the contractor] was honking his horn antagonizing picketers. I believe I kicked at the vehicle while it was entering the contractor gate.” As to the hood incident, he “jumped onto the hood of the vehicle because he was afraid of being hit.”

The other three employees in their written statements about the truck blockage stated the driver “cursed and yelled profanities” at the picketers while another blamed the driver’s poor driving: “[she] cut the corner short in an attempt to get me and my fellow union brothers off the picket line…this driver shut down the semi, in my opinion to blow things out of proportion.”

The security manager assembled a report recommending discharge. Here’s how the judge described the investigation and decision to discharge:

After [the manager] received the…discharge recommendation together with the investigative reports, photographs, the witnesses’ statements, the employees’ written statements, and the fact-finding notes, he conducted an independent review of the materials relative to the incidents involving [the four employees]. He also conferred with [the security manager] who conducted the fact-finding meetings and compiled the investigative reports. He subsequently agreed with [the manager’s] assessment regarding the incidents. . .

Charges were filed and the NLRB took the matter to trial.

The ALJ, Board Dismiss Complaint

The ALJ stated legal test for discipline during a strike was one of discrimination. The General Counsel has “the overall burden of proving discrimination” and must establish first that the employees were strikers and that the employer “took action against them for conduct associated with the strike.” If the threshold case is established the “burden shifts to the employer to establish that it had an honest belief that the employees in question engaged in the conduct for which they were discharged.” The employer’s burden, importantly, is “no more than that and it does not require it to prove that the strikers did in fact engage in misconduct.”

Applying this standard, the ALJ found that in both incidents the General Counsel established the threshold case.

As to the employee who kicked the truck the ALJ found the employee “intended to instill fear on the contractor’s part” not to return to the worksite during the strike. This finding was bolstered by the fact the employee admitted the conduct in his written statement and “knew” that his conduct was prohibited because both the union and employer had issued warnings. The judge found the conduct was “sufficiently egregious” to warrant his termination.

With respect to the three employees who blocked the truck the judge noted that the employees defended by stating the driver had “hurled insults and profanities” at them and they had a right to “stand their ground.” The ALJ evaluated this defense and discredited the employees’ version. The ALJ upheld the termination finding that even if the three employees were somehow provoked by the driver they would not be privileged to block the driveway and that by doing so they intended to intimidate the driver not to return while the stiker was ongoing.

On appeal, the Board upheld the dismissal of the complaint.

Takeaways

Labor disputes are chaotic and it can be very risky to discipline or discharge an employee for misconduct for the simple reason that the engaging in strike activities, such as picketing, is protected. The decision is noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First, the ALJ took pains to describe the legal standard as being one of “honest belief” that misconduct occurred rather than proving that the event actually occurred. While this has been the legal standard for many years one cannot always be confident that standard will actually be applied. It is much harder to prove that an employee actually engaged in certain misconduct. Indeed, the physical nature of the misconduct played a large role in this case (there was damage to a vehicle and the strikers standing in a certain position on the narrow access road in and out of the plant). If the misconduct was verbal only the case likely would have turned out differently as the Board is willing to condone a great deal of verbal misconduct as part and parcel of a labor dispute.

Second, the thoroughness of the employer’s investigation was very helpful. There are several elements of the employer’s investigation in this case which undoubtedly helped immensely in its defense, and of course, establishing its “honest belief” the discharged employees engaged in the misconduct. These elements are:

Having an experienced investigator conduct the investigation. Such a person knows the order of interviews, how to weigh evidence, etc.
Giving the accused the opportunity to provide his or her version in a written statement. If the accused provides a statement the employer has the version to consider; if no statement is provided, the employer can at least say it tried to get the employee’s version but could not compel participation. In this case, the employee who kicked the car admitted he did it. The other employees claimed their actions were warranted by provocation which sounded like more of an excuse to engage in misconduct. The fact due process is given is very important.
Discounting certain allegations based on the evidence. In this case, the vehicle that had the employee jump on the hood had a broken windshield. It would be easy to conclude that the employee’s conduct was responsible but the investigator could not be certain after watching the tapes and so appropriately did not attribute the act to the employee.
Layer of review. This is very important. After the investigation was completed, and a recommendation of termination was made, another manager independently reviewed all of the evidence and came to his own conclusion. Independent review allows the employer to see if two managers see the same set of facts the same way.

The absence of any one of these elements certain could give rise to the charge that the investigation was “results oriented” and therefore a pretextual reason made up to hide the discriminatory reason for the discharge.

Gridlock Broken: Senate Confirms John Ring as Newest Member of NLRB

By Mark Theodore on April 11, 2018 Posted in Employer policies, NLRB, Specialty Healthcare, Uncategorized

By a vote of 50 to 48 the U.S. Senate confirmed Republican John Ring as a Member of the National Labor Relations Board, giving the agency a full five member complement. Member Ring, whose term expires December 16, 2022, takes the seat previously held by Chairman Miscimarra.

The addition of Member Ring means, of course, that the Board now consists of a 3-2 majority favoring employers and can issue decisions changing current case law, something it could not do with four members split evenly along party lines. During the brief three month period when the agency last had five members (September-December 2017), it issued many decisions overturning precedent (which, to be fair, had been overturned or “clarified” in the previous 8 years). During those 90 days the Board, among other cases, eliminated micro units, restored the ability of ALJs to accept settlements over the objection of the Charging Party or General Counsel, and set forth a new standard for evaluating the legality of handbook language.

More such precedent correction can be expected in the coming months.

Tags: Board Members, confirmation, John Ring, Member Ring, NLRB, U.S. Senate

Unicorn Sighting: NLRB Overturns ALJ Credibility Determination

By Mark Theodore on March 13, 2018 Posted in General Counsel, NLRA, NLRB, Uncategorized

As we have seen, there are few things that can be counted on in labor relations. Oftentimes, several experts look at the same problem and come to vastly different conclusions (here, here and here are some examples). What is (almost) guaranteed, however, is that the NLRB rarely disturbs the determinations made by an Administrative Law Judge of witness credibility made during testimony at trial. This is mainly because the ALJ, as the sole fact finder, is the only person in a position to observe the demeanor of the witness and evaluate credibility.

In a fairly rare case, the NLRB recently refused to adopt an ALJ’s credibility determinations concluding that a judge’s determination that a charging party-witness was not credible was not something that could stand because it relied on “improper bases.”

In International Longshoremen’s Assn, Local 28, 366 NLRB No. 20 (February 20, 2018) the Charging Party was a female union member who claimed in a charge that her union discriminated against her in the referral of work and training opportunities for reasons related to her gender.

Charging Party Claims Sexual Harassment as Reason for Denial By Union of Work Opportunities.

The union operated hiring hall in which it dispatched union members to jobs. The union also sponsored training to allow its members to gain skills to perform additional jobs. Charging Party was a truck driver member of the union.

In the charge that initiated the case, the Charging Party stated that the union representative “unlawfully refused to allow . . .[Charging Party” to be placed on the certification list . . [and] refer …[Charging Party] to any jobs for unfair, arbitrary , and invidious considerations.” As with all unfair labor practice charges, the Charging Party had to swear under penalty of perjury the allegation was correct. After investigation, the General Counsel issued complaint and the matter went to trial.

The evidence established that for a period of years the Charging Party had received some work referrals through the union hall although on what amounted to a part-time basis. Part of getting additional work had to do with being certified to perform additional jobs, the skills for which required training. The Charging Party asserted that she had repeatedly requested the union to place her in training but the union denied these requests. Charging Party stated that on 10 separate occasions during a 5 year period when she went to the union representative’s office to discuss training and she was subjected to physical assault of a sexual nature in what she described in her testimony as a “never-ending cycle” of grabbing and groping.

The alleged harasser, a union representative, testified that he did not engage in any sexual harassment. The union also demonstrated Charging Party had in fact been referred to jobs through the union hiring hall which appeared to contradict the statement in the charge that Charging Party had not been referred to “any” jobs.

Thus, the case turned credibility of these two opposing witnesses. The ALJ recommended dismissal of the complaint after concluding Charging Party’s testimony was not credible.

ALJ Gives Three Reasons as to Why Charging Party’s Version was not Credible

In his decision, the judge noted first that Charging Party was a “highly uncooperative witness, who effortlessly answered virtually all of the General Counsel’s direct examination queries, but then responded to equally simple cross-examination questions with delays, pauses, additional questions, recollection issues, and reported confusion.” Had this basis formed the entirety of the judgment’s assessment that Charging Party was not credible the ruling likely would have been upheld on appeal.

The judge’s second reason for deciding Charging Party was not credible was the “glaringly false statement in her ULP charge.” This was a reference to the body of the charge which said Charging Party had not been referred to “any” jobs when, in fact, she had been sent to jobs.

The third reason the ALJ gave for the Charging Party’s lack of credibility was the “implausibility of several parts of her story.” In this regard, the ALJ noted that it was unbelievable that the Charging Party, “a tough woman who performs stevedoring work…and previously drove a truck in Iraq, would have meekly allowed [the union representative] to harass her a whopping 10 times, without an utterance.”

After the complaint was dismissed, the General Counsel appealed on the grounds that the judge’s credibility determinations were “based on sex stereotypes and demonstrated bias.”

A three member panel of the Board (Kaplan, Pearce and Emmanuel) agreed and set aside the decision. The Board remanded the case to the chief administrative law judge to assign to another judge to rehear the case.

Takeaway-It’s Still Hard To Attack A Credibility Determination

The burden to overturn a credibility determination is very high and that the Board’s general standard is not to disturb such determinations unless “a clear preponderance of the all the relevant evidence convinces [the Board] that they are incorrect.” Usually, when judges discredit testimony it is because of the demeanor of the witness which is nearly impossible to challenge.

This is an unusual and interesting case because the ALJ gave much more detailed reasons for his denial of the claim which ultimately led to reversal. In this case, the second and third reasons given by the judge were not typical. For example, using the statement in the charge as a basis to conclude the charging party was lying would open up many charges to attack. Such apparent conflicts between the charge allegation and the trial testimony are not usually given much weight for the simple reason that the literal words used on an unfair labor practice form, a document that does not require specificity and is often filled out without any expert assistance, would open up an entire new line of defense. Charging Party’s statement in her charge that she did not get “any” work opportunities when she in fact had been referred work was more along the lines of an exaggeration rather than an outright lie.

The third reason, that Charging Party’s accounts of harassment were “implausible” was the obvious focus of the Board in its reversal. The Board did not want to endorse a ruling that stated because an alleged victim of sexual harassment did not complain about each instance of harassment meant the allegations were “implausible.”

The case is an interesting insight into the determination of credibility, however.

Tags: charging party, credibility determinations, hiring hall, NLRA, NLRB, section 8(b)(1)(A), sex harassment, sex stereotypes, training

Impulse Control? NLRB Finds Employee’s Misconduct To Be Deliberate and “Predetermined” and Not Protected

By Mark Theodore on March 2, 2018 Posted in General Counsel, NLRA, NLRB, Protected activity, Section 8(a)(1), Uncategorized, Unfair Labor Practices

The past few weeks on the Labor Board front have been fairly routine, save for, of course, the high drama associated with the NLRB reversing its own decision (lest anyone think this is a super significant development, remember that this agency had scores of decisions overturned for lacking a proper quorum only to wait, quietly, and simply re-affirm the vast majority).

Legal drama is not as fun, or as interesting, as the day to day labor situations. A frequent topic here has been the intersection of protected activity and misconduct. More specifically, when does an employee’s otherwise protected activity become unprotected? There are endless situations and this is the stuff that makes labor relations interesting (and vexing, at times). The Board recently issued a decision in what we’ll call “the case of the unauthorized passcode use.”

In KHRG Employer LLC, 366 NLRB No. 22 (February 28, 2018), a hotel employer had been faced with an ongoing organizing drive. Many employees participated. One employee, a server at a restaurant on hotel premises, had engaged in protest activities, which included presenting a petition to hotel management inside the hotel lobby and picketing outside the hotel. The server had not been disciplined for any of these activities.

Server Uses Passcode To Allow Delegation To Enter Secured Area

On one occasion the server led a delegation of nine employees and five non-employees into the hotel to present another petition to the hotel’s General Manager who was in her office in a secure area of the hotel’s basement. The server did not know the names of all the folks in the delegation. The group was challenged by a security guard who informed the delegation that only 4 employees could proceed to the secure area of the hotel. Although the server was aware there were non-employees in the delegation, he falsely informed the security guard that all 14 of the group were employees and that they all had “right” to deliver the petition. The security guard let the group pass.

The secured area of the hotel is behind a locked door and is the place where the employer stores cash, corporate checks, guest contracts and personnel files. It is also the area of where hotel managers had their offices. In order to enter the secured area the server had to use a passcode, which he did. The server then led the delegation to the General Manager’s office where the petition was delivered. The entire sequence of events took 5 to 10 minutes, 2 of which were spent in the secured area.

Several employees complained that the delegation had entered the secure area, emailing both the server and management. The server was fired for a “serious security breach.” The server then filed charges.

The ALJ recommended dismissing the complaint although she applied the test normally reserved for evaluating whether employee speech is protected. The General Counsel appealed.

NLRB: The Server’s Actions Were Not Impulsive But Predetermined

A three person panel of the Board (Kaplan, McFerran and Pearce) voted unanimously to affirm the dismissal. The Board began its analysis by noting that “[t]here is no dispute that the delivery by the petition by employees constituted protected concerted activity.” The Board then noted that the employer had defended that the delivery of the petition was not the reason for the discharge; rather, the security breach constituted misconduct for which the employee deserved to be terminated. The Board noted:

When, as here, an employer defends a discharge based on employee misconduct that is a part of the res gestae of the employee’s protected concerted activity, the employer’s motive is not at issue. Instead, such discharges are considered unlawful unless the misconduct at issue was so egregious as to lose the protection of the Act. See, e.g., Consumers Power Co., 282 NLRB 130, 132 (1986).

To answer this question, the Board “balances employees’ right to engage in concerted activity, allowing some leeway for impulsive behavior, against employers’ right to maintain order and respect.” Piper Realty Co., 313 NLRB 1289, 1290 (1994).

Applying this standard, the Board noted that while the delegation was non-disruptive, “the dispositive point is that it advanced to the secure area only because [the server] misrepresented to the security guard that the delegation consisted only of employees and the delegation was able to enter the secure area only because [the server] used the passcode to provide the group unauthorized access.” The Board evaluated whether the employer had previously condoned unauthorized entry into the secured area, finding that while vendors and some family members of employees used the passcode, these individuals were all known to the employer. By contrast, the server had let in a “significant” number of non-employees, some of whom he did not personally know.

In dismissing the complaint, the Board noted that the “breach of security cannot be dismissed as an impulsive act. It was a predetermined course of action” which lost protection of the Act.

Takeaways

This case joins that of the errant human resources manager and the strident union adherent as another example of the complicated matters that confront employers when employees invoke protected concerted activity to justify behavior. Note, for example that the security guard relented and allowed a 14 person delegation proceed when the employee-server invoked the “rights” of “employees” to deliver a petition.

What made this case somewhat easier to decide (it is a rare 3-person panel made up of 2 Democrats and 1 Republican) is that it had to do with conduct as opposed to an evaluation if employee speech. The Board found it significant that the server did not know the names of the persons he was letting into the secured area. In this day and age, employers have an obligation to secure their premises. Of equal importance was that the employer had not allowed such breaches to occur. Of course, had the Board ruled that the discharge was unlawful, then it would have opened up potential floodgates where any access of an employer in the name of protected activity might have to be condoned.

The case illustrates the importance of articulating the reason for the discharge,–here “serious security breach.” The fact that the employer had not intertwined the delegation or other protected activities into the reason for the discharge very likely helped keep the focus on the misconduct. Of equal importance is that the case was not cluttered with other allegations of unlawful conduct such as threats or discipline for protected activities. What the Board had before it was an employer that understood that employees have the right to engage in certain activities; the employer simply could not condone the security breach.

Tags: access to secure area, discharge, discipline, egregious misconduct, NLRA, NLRB, protected activity, protected concerted activity, Section 8(a)(1), Section 8(a)(3), security breach, unprotected activity

ABOUT FACE! Under Pressure, NLRB Vacates Joint Employer Standard and Returns to Browning-Ferris

By Michael Lebowich, Joshua Fox and Jordan Simon on February 26, 2018 Posted in Joint Employer, NLRA, NLRB

In an unexpected and critical turn of events, after extensive political pressure, the NLRB, sitting as a three-member panel comprised of Chairman Kaplan and Members Pearce and McFerran, vacated last year’s decision in Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., 365 NLRB No. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017) due to Member William Emanuel’s participation in the decision. Prior to joining the Board, Member Emanuel was a partner at Littler Mendelson, and his firm represented one of the unsuccessful parties in the Browning-Ferris case—which established the “joint employer” standard that Hy-Brand overturned. The Board concluded that Emanuel should have recused himself from the decision.

The Hy-Brand decision, which we previously reported on here and here, reinstated the traditional joint-employer standard that was significantly relaxed under the Obama-era Board in Browning-Ferris. As a result of the Board’s order to vacate, Hy-Brand’s overruling of Browning-Ferris is of “no force or effect.” So for the time being, Browning-Ferris returns to being the law of the land, and this outcome could have far-reaching implications to future cases by the Board involving potential conflicts of interest involving Board members. Continue Reading

Tags: joint employer, NLRA, NLRB

Turns Out Attempting To Insert New Term Into Collective Bargaining Agreement Not Agreed To In Negotiations Violates The Law…Who Knew?

By Mark Theodore on February 9, 2018 Posted in Collective Bargaining, General Counsel, NLRA, NLRB, Section 8(a)(5), Section 8(b)(3), Uncategorized, Unfair Labor Practices

As we have noted previously, the make-up of the Board currently stands at four out of five total members, divided evenly between two warring factions making it pretty much impossible to change the law which requires a majority. It also means the precedent the new General Counsel has highlighted will not be reviewed until a fifth member is confirmed. The President has appointed attorney John Ring, who awaits confirmation from the Senate.

The Board is issuing decisions on non-controversial cases almost daily. There haven’t been many of interest, some default cases, others addressing garden variety issues. Every so often one of the cases catches the eye and is worth discussing. That is true of the Board’s recent decision in Operating Engineers, Local 501 (Brady Linen Services LLC), 366 NLRB No. 3 (January 23, 2018), which discusses the law concerning the legal duty to reduce a collective bargaining agreement to writing, and then sign it.

Negotiations Fail To Produce An Agreement: Employer Issues Last, Best And Final Offer

The facts are pretty straightforward. The employer runs a commercial laundry and its employees are represented by the union. The parties met to negotiate a successor collective bargaining agreement. One proposal concerned the use of apprentices. The apprentice proposal consisted of 3 sections. The employer and the union tentatively agreed on section 1 of the proposal and section 3 but not section 2. Section 2 concerned whether the employer would pay for apprentices. The employer’s proposal on section 2 in negotiations left the amount to be paid for apprentices blank.

The parties reached the end of negotiations and did not reach a tentative agreement on a new collective bargaining agreement. The employer issued a last, best and final offer to the union. The employer’s last, best and final contained no section 2 of the apprentice provision. The employer’s cover letter accompanying the offer stated, “Any outstanding union proposals, whether in the form of a formal proposal or in the form of contract language that is not identified above is, formally rejected.” The last, best and final offer did not include a section 2 in the apprenticeship proposal.

The union submitted the last, best and final for employee ratification. The employees voted to accept the offer. The union then stated that it would draft the CBAs for the employer’s review and signature. The union then submitted for signature a contract which contained section 2 of the apprentice provision. The employer immediately objected to the inclusion of this provision. After some back and forth with the union, the employer redacted section 2 and sent the agreement to the union for signature. The union refused to sign the agreement. The employer filed charges, alleging that the union’s failure to execute the agreed upon collective bargaining agreement violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act (which is the corollary to Section 8(a)(5) – requiring the employer to bargain in good faith).

Administrative Law Judge Finds Union Actions Violate Act In Two Different Ways

After a trial the ALJ reviewed the law regarding such issues:

It is well settled that the 8(d) obligation to bargain collectively requires either party, upon the request of the other party, to execute a written contract incorporating an agreement reached during negotiations. H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941). Specifically, the Board has held that under Section 8(b)(3) it is a per se violation for a union to refuse an employer’s request to sign a negotiated agreement. See Windward Teachers Assn., 346 NLRB 1148, 1150 (2006).

This is known in labor circles as a Heinz violation.

The union raised the defense that there could be no violation because of the dispute over whether the parties intended to include section 2 in the final agreement. This argument is one of contract law: that there was no meeting of the minds over the apprentice provision. Specifically, the union asserted the entire apprentice provision,–all 3 sections,– was “meaningless” if it did not include section 2. Since the parties agreed upon section 1 and section 3, they must have meant to include section 2. The judge disposed of this argument summarily, “[i]f the union believed this to be the case it could have communicated this exact sentiment prior to ratifying the agreement.” The judge also noted that the employer had made clear it was rejecting the all proposals not addressed in its last, best and final offer. The ALJ found the parties did have a meeting of the minds and the union’s failure to execute the redacted version of the collective bargaining agreement was a violation of Section 8(b)(3).

The ALJ also found the union to have separately violated Section 8(b)(3) by its insertion of the provision not agreed upon in negotiations into the draft collective bargaining agreement. The judge noted the insertion of section 2 was an unlawful attempt by the union to get what it could not get in negotiations: “The attempt to obtain terms that it deemed more favorable than the terms which it agreed upon by simply unilaterally inserting them constitutes an unlawful refusal to execute a completed contract in violation of the Act.”

Takeaways

The Heinz violation has been around for at least 77 years, so it’s hardly new. Both employers and unions are required to reduce the agreement they make to writing and sign it or they violate the duty to bargain. Signing an agreement has special significance in Board law. Among other things, a signed agreement serves as an absolute bar to employees filing a decertification petition during the term of the agreement (with some timing limitations), while an unsigned agreement does not bar such a petition. A signed agreement also, obviously, is more easily enforced as it signifies to the entire world that this is the deal, and that the parties signed it after evaluation of its terms.

The other main takeaway from this case, and this may be more important than understanding the law about signing the agreement, is that it is very important for parties in negotiations to carefully document what is being offered and what is not being offered. Had the employer not indicated that all items not addressed in its last, best and final offer were rejected, the union’s argument that there was no meeting of the minds would have more substance behind it.

Tags: collective bargaining, collective bargaining agreement, Heinz violation, NLRA, NLRB, Section 8(b)(3), section 8(d), signing

NLRB Reverses Information Request Decision…After Court Reverses Board Decision

By Mark Theodore on January 16, 2018 Posted in Collective Bargaining, Duty to furnish information, Duty to provide information, NLRA, NLRB, Section 8(a)(1), Section 8(a)(5), Uncategorized, Unfair Labor Practices

December saw a flurry of decisions (discussed here, here, here and here) by the NLRB as it briefly held a full complement. The Board currently has only four members and so law-changing decisions are less likely to occur until a new member is confirmed.

Board cases still proceed through the courts. Sometimes, as we have seen here and here, a federal appeals court refuses to enforce an agency decision. That happened recently in a case where the Board had made it unlawful for an employer to fail to respond to a clearly irrelevant information request. This was an expansion of the law, imposing a legal obligation to respond to an information request that did not trigger an obligation to provide the information. In other words, even though the request for information by the union was not something the employer had a legal obligation to provide, the Board nevertheless found the employer committed an unfair labor practice by failing to “timely respond[] in some timely manner” to the union. We previously reported on this decision here.

That case was appealed to U.S. Court of Appeals for the District Columbia Circuit and the court refused enforcement. 823 F.3d 696 (D.C. Cir. 2016) The Board considered the case on remand from the court in Iron Tiger Logistics, Inc., 366 NLRB No. 2 (January 9, 2018). On remand, the Board (Chairman Kaplan and Members Pearce and McFerran) “accept[ed] the court’s interpretation of the facts and the administrative law judge’s decision” and dismissed the complaint. In particular, the Board noted:

Given the judge’s unexcepted-to finding that on the day after requesting the information at issue the Union conceded its irrelevance that the request was ‘bulls%*t,’ we conclude that the Respondent was not obligated to do anything more. A respondent’s obligation with respect to information requests is triggered by requests for relevant information, and the presumption of relevance can be rebutted.

As we reported when the original case was decided, the law regarding information requests applies equally to both employers and unions, so imposing an obligation to respond regardless of the validity of the request can only cause mischief. It creates an obligation to bargain where none previously existed. As labor practitioners know, sometimes the information request is merely a tactic to cause leverage. The Board’s original decision not only furthered, but actually implicitly endorsed, the illegitimate use of information requests.

We will, of course, keep you informed of further developments as they occur. We still await what will happen with the General Counsel’s new initiatives as well as the Board’s re-examination of the new election rules.